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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JOANNA MURPHY,
Claimant/Petitioner,
BRIEF OF THE PETITIONER
CASE NO. 20020942-CA
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD
LONG TERM DISABILITY PROGRAM
Respondent.

BRIEF OF THE PETITIONER

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(a), § 49-11-613(7), and § 63-46b-16.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Whether the Utah State Retirement Board incorrectly interpreted the law of hearsay
in administrative hearings when it failed to consider medical reports and medical statements
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in its findings, concluding that "a finding of fact that was contested may not be based solely
on hearsay evidence unless that evidence is admissible under the Utah Rules of Evidence."
Standard of review.

The standard of review of the Board's denial of benefits is

governed by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA). UAPA provides, in relevant
part:
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been
substantially prejudiced by any of the following:

(d)Petitioner must be substantially prejudiced by the agency's erroneous
interpretation or application of the law.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d).
The issue of whether medical evidence and medical statements were incorrectly
excluded as hearsay from consideration in the Board's findings, is reviewed under Utah Code
Ann. § 63-46b 10(3) and under the "residuum rule." A correction-of-error standard, giving
no deference to agencies decisions, is used to review agencies' ruling on issues characterized
as general law, including " rulings concerning interpretation of statutes unrelated to the
agency." Morton Intern, Inc. v. Auditing Div.. 814 P.2d 581, at 585 (Utah 1991). Because
the agency is interpreting the UAPA, which is a general statute unrelated to the agency's own
statute and its discretionary grants, the Board's statutory interpretation and application should
be reviewed for correctness. This court has held that whether factual findings are based on
a residuum of competent evidence is a question of law reviewed for correctness. Industrial
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Power Contractors v. Industrial Com'n, 832 P.2d 477 (Utah App.1992).
2. Whether the Board is required to decide the "reasonableness," of gainful
employment a claimant is found capable of, provided by the definition of "total disability,"
including a consideration of any relevant vocational elements, and has incorrectly interpreted
the law when concluding it has no burden of providing any vocational proof on this issue
once a claimant has proved her impairment and functional limitations.
Standard of Review: Petitioner must be substantially prejudiced by the agency's
erroneous interpretation or application of the law. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(c) and
(d).
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "[t]he fact that the Administrative Procedure
Act incorporates the terms 'application of the law' and 'interpretation of the law' under a
single standard supports the contention that absent a grant of discretion, an agency's
interpretation or application of statutory terms should be reviewed for error." Morton Intern.,
Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991).
3. Whether the Utah State Retirement Board's decision denying long-term disability
benefits was based upon substantial evidence.
Standard of Review. Petitioner must be substantially prejudiced by:
(g) The agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied
by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in
light of the whole record before the court;
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g).
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When determining whether an agency finding is supported by substantial evidence
when viewed in light of the whole, this court weighs evidence that both supports and detracts
from the finding. Grace Drilling v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 67, 68 (Utah Ct.
App.1989). Substantial evidence is something less than the weight of the evidence, but more
than a mere scintilla of evidence. Id., at 68. Substantial evidence is that quantum and quality
of relevant evidence that will convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion. First Nat'l
Bank v. County Bd. of Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163,1165 (Utah 1990). However, findings
will "not be overturned if based on substantial evidence, even if another conclusion from the
evidence is permissible." Hurley v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 767 P.2d 524,
526-27 (Utah 1988).
A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports
the challenged finding. Rule 24(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (1990). The burden
lies with the petitioner, as the complaining party, to "marshall all of the evidence supporting
the findings and show that despite the supporting facts, and in light of the conflicting or
contradictory evidence, the findings are not supported by substantial evidence." Grace
Drilling Co. v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 776 P.2d at 68.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following statutes are controlling in this action:
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d), (g), (h)(i) and (h)(iv)
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reissued September 26,2002. The revised Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order
denying benefits was adopted as the order of the Utah State Retirement Board on October
10, 2002. This is an appeal from the above mentioned final agency action.
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Joanna is 50 years old, born August 23, 1951. She graduated from Bingham High
School, then attended the University of Utah, obtaining a Bachelor's degree in psychology
in 1975. She successfully pursued a career as a Child Care Licensing Specialist for the State
of Utah from 1987, until her medical condition forced her to discontinue work in 1998. As
Dr. Joseph A. Brown explained in a letter dated August 14, 1998, Joanna was seriously ill
at that time with chronic active Hepatitis C. Her illness was complicated by treatment with
interferon and its serious side effects, leaving her with a substantial illness four to five days
a week. (Petitioner's Exhibit 2). During this same period, Joanna continued to developed
other associated medical problems that have gradually worsened. Though Joanna's liver
functions returned to normal by December of 2000, and the hepatitis C virus is at remission
levels, she was left with a combination of severe physical impairments. Joanna has been
medically determined to suffer from fibromyalgia, with associated fatigue, myalgias,
arthralgias, insomnia, headaches, blepharitis, plantar fasciitis, and a tendency to develop
other focal pain and inflammation. (Petitioner's Exhibits 3-14). She is diagnosed with, and
is treated for several autoimmune diseases, hashimoto thyroiditis (Petitioner's Exhibits 14,
15) celiac disease (Petitioner's Exhibits 15, 16, 17) and allergic reactions (Petitioner's
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Exhibits 18-20). Additionally, she had been diagnosed, and is treated for Type II Diabetes
1\ 1 ;:i:lll;tus (Petitioner's Exhibit 15) gastroesophageal reflux, lrrnaiiic nowcl syndrom.
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agency collects the information needed to determine "reasonable" employment, considering
the employees medical-vocational background. The agency should continue this role at the
hearing level. In this sense, the agency has some burden of proof already built into its
procedures, to enable its determinations. This burden should remain with the agency, and
should not shift to the employee at the hearing level, to provide the vocational expertise
required to make a determination of "reasonable" employment, after she has proven her
impairments and functional limitations.
Lastly, the Board's denial of disability benefits rested upon the testimony and
evaluation by a physical therapist, as well as the purported failure of Dr. Bateman to provide
sufficient evidence supporting proof of disability. The physical therapist has training and
experience rehabilitating and evaluating injured workers, primarily in workers' compensation
cases. According to the testimony of Dr. Bateman, a consulting specialist Ms. Murphy was
referred to, and supported by medical reports and statements of many other doctors, Ms.
Murphy has a systemic illness of a chronic nature, rather than an acute work-related injury.
Dr. Bateman testified that the type of evaluation performed by the physical therapist is
inadequate for evaluating the expected on-the-job performance by those with systemic
illness. Medical reports and statements supporting Ms. Murphy's medical problems, and
functional limitations were not considered by the Board in its findings.

8

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE BOARD ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED THE HEARSAY RULE
WHEN IT EXCLUDED MEDICAL RECORDS AND MEDICAL
STATEMENTS FROM ITS FINDINGS OF FACT
The Board excluded from its consideration of the issue of medical impairment twentytwo exhibits, and approximately 116 pages of medical reports and medical statements,
including those of numerous diagnostic tests.1 After admitting the medical reports and
medical statements into evidence, the Board finds:
6. Petitioner failed to provide any non-hearsay evidence showing she
maintained any medically determinable physical impairment from accepted
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.
Order, dated September 26, 2002, Findings of Fact, p. 3. The Public Employees'
Long-Term Disability Act defines 'Total disability":
'Total disability" means, after the elimination period and the first 24 months
of disability benefits, the complete inability, based solely on physical objective
medical impairment, to engage in any gainful occupation which is reasonable,
considering the eligible employee's education, training, and experience.
Utah Code Ann.§ 49-21-102(1 l)(b). "Objective medical impairment" is defined:
"Objective medical impairment" means an impairment resulting from an injury
or illness which is diagnosed by a physician and which is based on accepted
objective medical tests or findings rather than subjective complaints.

diagnostic tests include an MRI, a nerve conduction study (EEG), laboratory
reports, a biopsy, testing related to sleep disorder, and pulmonary function.
9

It is true that many of the medical records and statements admitted into evidence,
including medical documents of laboratory and other diagnostic testing, were hearsay. Ms.
Murphy was unable to produce as witnesses the numerous doctors, radiologists, hospital
technicians, and other health care professionals, involved in the treatment, diagnosing, and
testing of her medical problems.2
As this Court noted in Cordova v. Blackstock, 861 P.2d 449 (Utah App. 1993):
The Utah Supreme Court has determined that there are "significant differences
between court trials and proceedings before administrative agencies and that
the technical rules of evidence need not be applied before the latter." Yacht
Club v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, 681 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Utah 1984)
(footnote omitted). Hearsay evidence is admissible in proceedings before
administrative agencies. Id. However, findings of fact cannot be based
exclusively on hearsay evidence; they must be supported by a residuum of
legal evidence competent in a court of law. Id.

Evidence of Ms. Murphy's impairments does not rest exclusively on hearsay. The
necessary residuum of competent evidence supporting a finding that Ms. Murphy has
physical impairments consists of the Ms. Murphy's and Dr. Bateman's sworn testimony
regarding her impairments. Once an employee's testimony concerning her impairments is
supported with the objective medical data supplied in medical reports, the claims of disability
should no longer be considered merely "subjective complaints," but should be considered

2

It seems unlikely there are many disabled employees who are able to afford such
an onerous requirement, or are able to track down the considerable numbers of
individuals involved in the production of their medical records, to provide testimony
under oath about the truth of the matters reported in those documents.
10

competent testimony of the claimant's direct knowledge of an "objective medical
impairment." The information providing objective clinical, laboratory, and diagnostic testing
data, should no longer be considered mere hearsay when testified to under oath by those with
direct knowledge on the issue of Ms. Murphy's impairments, i.e., Ms. Murphy and Dr.
Bateman.
The Board offered no objections at the hearing to any of the medical documents or
medical statements submitted as evidence, and all twenty five of Ms. Murphy's exhibits were
admitted into evidence. Tr. 3:22 through 7: 6. Ms. Murphy provided sworn testimony at the
hearing on April 29, 2002, regarding all of the impairments documented in the medical
records and also testified to her functional limitations associated with these impairments;
information which is also reported in several medical statements by Ms. Murphy's doctors
and her physical therapist.
Ms. Murphy testified to her esophagus reflux, Tr. 10:17, insomnia, Tr. 10:19-24,22:
12-25,23: 1-11, plantar fasciitis, Tr. 11:1-14,31: 13-14, physical therapy and exercises, 11:
1-11, 14: 7-12, 31: 2-3, allergies and blepharitis, Tr. 11:19-25, 28: 20-24, functional
limitations, Tr. 12:10-13,16:1-23,17:13-25,23:12-25,24:1-3, hypothyroidism,^. 12:25,
fatigue, Tr. 13:10-19, neck pain and headache, Tr. 13: 22-23, 17: 2-9, carpel tunnel, Tr.
14:8-11, 18: 11-25, 19: 1-12, 35: 23-25, 36: 1-3, celiac disease and diabetes, Tr. 14: 16-25,
15:1-14,28:1-14, automobile accidents, Tr. 21:15-24, hepatitis C,Tr. 21:19-24, Interferon
therapy, Tr. 22:2-7, pain and fatigue, Tr. 27: 1-18, irritable bowel syndrome, Tr. 27: 11,
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fibromyalgia and chronic fatigue, Tr. 29:4-11,31: 4-12, MRI and EEG, Tr. 36: 18-20. Ms.
Murphy testified she was diagnosed with fibromyalgia by Dr. Anderson, Dr. Kurrus, and Dr.
Lee Smith, and was referred to Dr. Bateman by Dr. Barbuto.
Dr. Bateman testified as an expert in the area of chronic fatigue and fibromyalgia, and
as a consulting specialist to whom Ms. Murphy had been referred by her doctor. Tr. 36:1032, 38: 9-15, 29: 2-15. Dr. Bateman testified she evaluated Ms. Murphy in an initial
consultation on October 27, 2000, and again on February 20, 2002. As part of the first
consultive exam, and after an extensive review of Ms. Murphy's medical and psychosocial
history, Dr. Bateman found that Ms. Murphy met the medical criteria for fibromyalgia. Tr.
42-44. Dr. Bateman then testified, in depth, about Ms. Murphy's underlying medical
problems "contributing and compounding" her fibromyalgia symptoms, and included
numerous references to the information found in the medical and diagnostic reports she had
reviewed. Tr.43:14-25,44:1-9. Dr. Bateman read from her own evaluation of Ms. Muphy
that "with this complex medical history, the fibromyalgia syndrome must be considered
secondary to multiple underlying risk factors." Tr. 44: 20-22. Dr. Bateman opined at length
on Ms. Murphy's underlying illnesses, and that fibromyalgia syndrome often occurs "in a
piggyback fashion to other underlying illnesses." Tr. 45:12-15. Dr. Bateman testified these
underlying illnesses include chronic hepatitis C, multiple head and neck trauma, type two
diabetes, and autoimmune disease, which included her autoimmune thyroid disease, allergies,
celiac and other "gut" disease . 43: 18-25, 44: 1-8, 22-24, 45: 1-4. Dr. Bateman read and
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opined upon Dr. Anderson's Residual Functional Capacity Questionnaire, agreeing with Dr.
Anderson's assessment that, "given Joanna's combination of medical problems, that she
would probably miss many more than four days per month, and would have difficulty
working sequential full-time days, even in a week." Tr. 58: 21-25, 59: 1-16.
Dr. Bateman testified about Ms. Murphy's sleep disorders, common with
fibromyalgia, and found in Dr. Bateman's consultive report. Tr. 70: 8-25, 71: 1-8. Dr.
Bateman also testified regarding Ms. Murphy's bowel function disorders, affected "because
people with fibromyalgia get autonomic neurologic dysfunction, with includes regulation of
bowel function . . . and hormonal and neurotransmitter abnormalities, which affect bowel
function. Tr. 72: 1-7. Dr. Bateman opined about Ms. Murphy's "feeling lightheaded when
she stands, and (inaudible) equilibrium bumping into walls, which is also well established."
Tr. 72: 19-24.
Dr. Bateman testified:
The objective data, if I may list it, is just strong objective - data supporting
(inaudible) supporting diabetes . . . neuropathy, pain, and fatigue are common
symptoms of diabetes. She has clearly diagnosed hepatitis C. . . And I've
already said that all of her symptoms could come from hepatitis C. She has
documented hypothroidism. She has documented allergies, hypersensitivity,
pneunomitis and herpes simplex." Tr. 83:25. Dr. Bateman testified that "it's
listed in my report that she has carpal tunnel."
Tr. 83: 7-8. Dr. Bateman also testified there is medical evidence that would support a neck
or head injury. Tr. 84: 18-23.
Because of the foregoing sworn testimony given by Ms. Murphy and Dr. Bateman,
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it was incorrect to exclude the medical records from any consideration from the Findings of
Fact based upon hearsay. Both Ms. Murphy and Dr. Bateman provided an ample residuum
of competent evidence upon which to base findings of "objective medical impairment."
The Utah Supreme Court has held it to be improper in a worker's compensation case
for an administrative law judge to reject the statements of treating physicians which were
unavailable as witnesses on the basis of hearsay. Bunnell v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 740
P.2d 1331, (Utah 1987). The court found, 'There was no reason for the rejection of the
statements on that basis." IcL at 1333.
In this case, there is little difference in its effect, from rejecting the statements of
treating physicians as evidence, and rejecting that same evidence from all consideration on
the issue of medical impairments or functional limitations.
The Board's basis for refusing to consider the medical records and medical statements
is found in its Conclusions of Law:
3. In formal administrative adjudicative proceedings, "A finding of fact that
was contested may not be based solely on hearsay evidence unless that
evidence is admissible under the Utah Rules of Evidence." U.C.A. § 63-46b10(3).
Order, dated September 26, 2002, Findings of Fact, p. 3, Conclusions of Law, p. 4.
The Board's reliance on the above UAPA provision is rather confusing, in that the
medical records and medical statements submitted into evidence by Ms. Murphy were not
contested by the Board's only witness, Mr. Cory Davis. Mr. Davis, a physical therapist,
testified only to his own functional evaluation of Ms. Murphy, but made no medical findings,
14

and did not contest any medical or clinical findings, diagnoses, laboratory or diagnostic
testing reported in any medical reports or statements.
POINT TWO
THE BOARD ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO DECIDE THE ISSUE
OF "REASONABLENESS" AND CONCLUDED IT SHARES
NO BURDEN IN DETERMINING 'TOTAL DISABILITY"
In its Conclusions of Law, the Board states:
1. Pursuantto Utah Code Ann. §49-1-610 and §49-9-401, Petitioner bears the
burden of proof in this matter. The Utah State Retirement Board is not subject
to any state or federal statute, rule, or common law, such as any shifting
burden standard, in determining whether a Petitioner qualifies for long-term
disability benefits under Utah Code Annotated, Title 49.
Order, dated September 26, 2002, Conclusions of Law, p. 3. In its Findings of Fact, the
Board finds:
4 . . . . [Dr. Bateman] testified that she was not an employment specialist and
did not know the legal standards for disability in this case.
Order, dated September 26, 2002, Findings of Fact, p. 2.
It is true that the Utah State Retirement and Insurance Benefit Act imposes a burden
of proof upon appellants. Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-613(4) provides under the statutory
section entitled "Appeals procedure - Right of appeal to hearing officer - Board
reconsideration - Judicial review":
(4) The moving party in any proceeding brought under this section shall bear
the burden of proof.
The above provision imposes a burden of proof upon an employee when she appeals
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a decision to the executive director, to the hearing officer, and to the Board. However, as
discussed below, there are numerous procedures and provisions followed by the Public
Employees' Health Program ("PEHP")which demonstrate its involvement with vocational
information gathering and determinations of "total disability" based upon that vocational
information, and which occur prior to the levels of appeal for which the statutory burden of
proof is provided.
Utah Code Ann. § 49-21-401 provides:
(1) An eligible employee shall apply for long-term disability benefits under
this chapter by:

(b) signing a consent form allowing the office access to the eligible
employee's medical records; and
(c) providing any documentation or information reasonably requested
by the office.
(2) Upon request by the office, the participating employer of the eligible
employee shall provide to the office documentation and information
concerning the eligible employee.
The Public Employees' Health Program ("PEHP") Long-Term Disability ("LTD")
Program Master Policy3 provides under "G. How to file a Claim," as part of the application
process:
1. The following information must be submitted to and received by the
Program within 90 days of initial application:
a. . . . a signed consent form allowing the office access to the
3

See Master Policy pp. 4-6 in Addendum 10
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Eligible Employee's medical records and employment records;
b. A detailed statement from Physician(s) describing the
objective basis for the diagnosis (including x-ray reports, and
any other evaluative procedures);

4. Eligible Employer must provide relevant information concerning the
Eligible Employee's status, including: payroll information, job description,
inability to perform services, job accommodation, etc.

The Master Policy further provides, under H. Claims Appeal Process:
1. If an Eligible Employee feels a disability claim has been denied
inappropriately, a full review of the claim may be requested by writing to the
LTD Claims Review Committee within 60 days of the date of the denial letter.
The Master Policy additionally provides under "D. Rehabilitation":
1. All Eligible Employees receiving a Monthly Disability Benefit under the
Program shall be evaluated and when appropriate may be required to engage
in a rehabilitation program.
2. . . . The program may refer the Eligible Employee to a disability specialist
for a review of the Eligible Employee's condition and a written rehabilitation
plan.
The above provisions delineate part of the process the LTD program undergoes when
an employee pursues a claim for long-term disability benefits. The program collects medical
information from the employees' medical sources, and vocational and employment
information from the employer. The LTD program is also authorized to provide vocational
evaluation and rehabilitation, referring the employee to individuals with expertise in that
area, to determine the possibility for reentry into the job market. After gathering the relevant
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information the LTD program makes its determinations of "total disability."
The LTD program provides for two levels of disability determinations on the issue of
"total disability," made by the agency before the burden of proof imposed by § 49-11-613(4)
occurs. Utah Code Ann. § 49-21-401(3) provides for the program's initial determination
under a section entitled "Disability benefits - Application - Eligibility":
(3) The office shall review all relevant information and determine whether or
not the eligible employee is totally disabled.
Utah Code Ann. § 49-21-102(1 l)(b) defines "Total disability":
"Total disability" means, after the elimination period and the first 24 months
of disability benefits, the complete inability, based solely on physical objective
medical impairment, to engage in any gainful occupation which is reasonable,
considering the eligible employee's education, training, and experience.

Upon being denied disability benefits beyond the initial two year period, Ms. Murphy
was informed that the process of appeal was identical to her initial application: she was
notified that a caseworker had determined she was not "totally disabled" beyond the first
two-year period of disability, and that she could appeal this denial by requesting review by
the LTD Review Committee. Petitioner's Exhibit lc. The LTD Review Committee then
requested information regarding Ms. Murphy's functional restrictions and limitations relative
to her activities of "daily living, sedentary employment, and rehabilitation efforts."
Petitioner's Exhibit Id. The LTD Review Committee next issued a denial stating "with
proper management of your conditions, work within sedentary classifications is appropriate."
Petitioner's Exhibit le.
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Ms. Murphy was at no time required to determine, based upon her medical records,
employment and vocational information, physical therapy and rehabilitation records, what
type of job would be "reasonable" for her, considering her impairments and other vocational
information. The LTD Review Committee arrived at the conclusion, after reviewing her
records, that Ms. Murphy would be capable of working at jobs with a "sedentary
classification." This conclusion by the LTD Review Committee seems to reference the same
classification of jobs according to their strength or exertional requirements, as defined by the
Department of Labor's Dictionary of Occupational Titles ("DOT"), which was later testified
to by the Board's witness.4
This approach by the LTD Program, is entirely consistent with other agencies
responsible for making disability determinations. In related areas of disability law, such as
Social Security disability, and Workers' Compensation, a disability claimant is required to
prove, through objective medical evidence, the impairments from which she suffers, and the
degree of functional limitations resulting from these impairments. If the claimant's proven
impairments, when considered along with other relevant vocational factors, prevent the
claimant from either returning to prior work, or from fitting into well established exertional
levels or categories of work available in the economy as defined by the Department of Labor
(such as work within a "sedentary" or "light" classification), then agencies in these related

4

The DOT's categorization of job's according to "strength ratings" was submitted
as Exhibit C at the hearing.
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areas of disability law, have generally been considered to be in the best position to provide
evidence there is work the claimant can perform, taking their functional limitations and
vocational situation into consideration.5
Under Social Security disability law, the Code of Federal Regulations provides
medical and vocational guidelines which are displayed in the Code as a system of "grids."6
This medical-vocational analysis codified in the "grids," synchronizes various combinations
of DOT catagories of "strength ratings" ("sedentary", "light," "medium," etc.) with various
vocational elements ("age," "education," "job skills," "experience"). When a disability
claimant does not fit neatly within the medical-vocational guidelines of the "grids," the
agency provides vocational experts to testify, providing information concerning what types
of jobs are available in the national economy, considering the functional limitations due to
medical impairments and the individual's vocational situation. This approach, and its
"burden shifting," has long been supported by Federal case law. Channel v. Heckler, 742
F2d 577, 579 (10th Cir. 1984)7.

5

See Addendum 6-1 and 7-1. In both Social Security disability law and Workers'
Compensation law, the function that remains with an individual, after taking all medical
impairments into account, is termed the "residual functional capacity." Utah Code Ann.
§ 34A-2-413(l)(c)(iv); and 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)-(f).
6

See Addendum 8-1

7

"The ALJ may apply the Secretary's medical-vocational guidelined (the grids) in
lieu of taking the testimony of a vocational expert only when the grids accurately and
completely describe the claimant's abilities and limitations." Jones v. Hedkler, 760 F.2d
993, 998 (9th Cir. 1985). The Secretary may not rely on the grids alone when they do not
accurately and comletely describe a claimant's RFC, the Secretary must also hear the testimony
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Workers' Compensation law has a similar concept guiding medical-vocational
determinations-that of the "odd lot." The "odd-lot" concept developed out of a common
sense notion, and has also long been applied. The term "odd lot" was first used in the case
of Cardiff Corp. v.Hall 1 K.B. 1009 (1911):
[Tjhere are cases in which the onus of sh[o]wing that suitable work can in fact
be obtained does fall upon the employer who claims that the incapacity of the
workman is only partial. If the accident has left the workman so injured that
he is incapable of becoming an ordinary workman of average capacity in any
well known branch of the labour market- if in other words the capacities for
work left to him fit him only for special uses and do not, so to speak, make his
powers of labour a merchantable article in some of the well known lines of the
labour market, I think it is incumbent upon the employer to sh[o]w that such
special employment can in fact be obtained by him. If I might be allowed to
use such an undignified phrase, I should say that if the accident leaves the
workman's labour in the position of an "odd lot" in the labour market, the
employer must sh[o]w that a customer can be found who will take it.
The Utah Supreme Court followed the logic of this analysis when it opined in Marshall v.
Industrial Commission, 704 P.2d 581 (Utah 1985):
It is much easier for the [employer] to prove the employability of the
[employee] for a particular job than for the [employee] to try to prove the
universal negative of not being employable at any work.
Marshall citing Brown v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 704 P.2d 305 (1970). This "burden shifting"
to the agency occurs even though Workers' Compensation Law also imposes the burden of
proving "total disability" on the employee. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(l)(b) provides:
To establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensation, the
employee has the burden of proof to show by a preponderance of evidence
that:
of a vocational expert. Perminter .v Heckler, 765 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1985).
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(ii) the employee is permanently totally disabled;
In analytical "steps" very similar to Social Security disability law, step four of Utah Code
Ann. § 34A-2-413(c) provides that "to find an employee permanently totally disabled, the
commission shall conclude that:
(iv) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably available, taking into
account the employee's age, education, past work experience, medical
capacity, and residual functional capacity.
In the present case, the LTD program has the responsibility for determining "total
disability" before the statutory burden is imposed upon an employee claiming long-term
disability; the LTD program currently accepts and exercises its position in making vocational
determinations based upon the claimant's demonstrated medical impairments and functional
limitations. These initial determinations occur after the employee meets her burden of
providing medical evidence to the LTD Program to prove the degree of her impairment. This
sharing of burdens provided in the initial determination levels should inform the statutory
burden imposed at the next levels of appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-613(4).
Accordingly, these relative burdens, already incorporated into the procedures at the two
initial levels of the agency's determinations, should be retained throughout the appeals
process.
In fact, the procedures used at the hearing in the present case indicate that the Board
has, at least in some of its actions, accepted this burden. A physical therapist was brought
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in to evaluate Ms. Murphy and to provide testimony at her hearing in regards to her
functional and vocational abilities. Because the physical therapist in this case testified he had
never seen the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, and his training and experience did not
support the requisite vocational expertise, he was not qualified to testify to the issue of
"reasonableness," or how particular medical impairments, might effect an individual's job
prospects, considering that individuals particular vocational profile8. Tr. 103: 8-11.
The definition of "total disability" clearly anticipates that a finding must be made
concerning what is "reasonable" employment for the claimant, and that vocational elements
must be considered when making this finding. The only remaining question is who must
provide the vocational experts that can provide this critical information for the "total
disability" findings-the disabled employee who may have few monetary resources at their
disposal, or the agency, which is to some degree already providing this necessary element.
POINT THREE
MARSHALING THE RESPONDENT'S EVIDENCE SHOWS
THE BOARD FAILED TO SUPPORT ITS DECISION
WITH SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

Marshaling Respondent's Evidence. Mr. Cory Davis, a physical therapist, performed
a Physical Functional Capacity Evaluation on Ms. Murphy November 17,2000, and testified
for the Board concerning Ms. Murphy's evaluation at the hearing. Mr. Davis opined in his

;

This issue is developed more fully on pages 30-33 of this brief.
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evaluation that "Ms. Murphy can do more, at times, than she currently demonstrates, states
or perceives." Respondent's Exhibit B, p. 5.

The Functional Capacity Evaluation reports:

despite times of significantly high pain ratings and reported fatigue she
remained lighthearted, freely laughed and joked without apparent difficulty.
This general attitude, combined with other observations such as excessive and
non-anatomical pain drawing, excessively low functional status' reporting, self
limitation without observed secondary muscle recruitment, etc. are considered
to be signs of symptom magnification.
Respondent's Exhibit B, p. 5. Mr. Davis testified, "She did have or seem to demonstrate an
ability to do something more than what maybe her perceived ability would be." Tr. 90:8-10.
Mr. Davis further pointed out that Ms. Murphy rated her level of disability at the time at
seventy percent, which would be considered "crippling," and which is, on the rating scale,
the most severe. She "actually rated herself below what would be considered sedentary level
of work, or level of ability." Tr. 93: 7-17, 94: 9-11. Mr. Davis testified:
the things she completed in the intake interview would lead one to believe that
she was severely disabled or had a severe difficulty in performing many
activities. And yet what I observed over the two days of activities that we did,
she demonstrated that she was capable of doing quite a few activities.
Tr. 96: 9-14. Mr. Davis, testified that the evaluation was divided over a two-day period of
time and, referring to his evaluation report, testified he found she was able to participate in
the evaluation over both days, lasting anywhere from two to three hours each day. Tr. 88:2022, 89: 24-25, 90: 1-2.
Mr. Davis's evaluation included testing for activities of sitting, standing, walking,
climbing stairs, manual dexterity, range of motion, and strength measurements, including
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lifting, carrying, pushing, pulling, grip, and pinch. Mr. Davis's evaluation reported Ms.
Murphy could sit for 100 minutes, stand for 14 minutes, dynamic stand for 19 minutes, walk
.23 miles in 10 minutes at 1.5 mph., demonstrate a pinch strength that was "average" when
compared to the general population, was able to reach, stoop, squat and bend, lift 30 lbs. 4
inches, 35 lbs. 12 inches, 25 lbs. waist to chest, 20 lbs. chest to eye level, carry 25 lbs. for 30
feet, push a 60 lb. cart for 10 feet, pull a 40 lb. cart for 10 feet, and demonstrate average
manual dexterity according to the VALPAR Assembly test, average to poor with the
Minnesota Rate of Manipulation test, and average to poor fine dexterity using the Purdue
Pegboard test. Respondent's Exhibit B, pp. 2-5.
Mr. Davis reported that Ms. Murphy demonstrated "good functional strength of the
lower extremities with good body mechanics." He reported:
Ms. Murphy demonstrated average functional abilities in the LIGHT physical
Demand Characteristic of Work Level according the the U.S. Dept. of Labor.
The limitations observed were mostly dealing with apparent poor functional
upper extremity strength.
Respondent's Exhibit B, p. 6. Mr. Davis's testified that based upon Ms. Murphy's ability
to lift thirty-five pounds 12 inches to a knuckle, and her ability to lift a twenty five pound box
and carry it thirty feet, that Ms. Murphy "would actually be into the medium category." Mr.
Davis's testimony was consistent with his Functional Capacity Evauation, and he explained
in more detail the procedures he used during his evaluation. Tr. 96-101. Mr. Davis testified
that, based upon what he observed, he felt that Ms. Murphy would be capable of a light, "and
probably capable of at least a sedentary type job." Tr. 102: 6-8.
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The Board finds that Dr. Bateman testified she "could not provide an opinion about
Petitioner's specific physical abilities, but could only provide a general opinion about
individuals who suffer from fibromyalgia from her 'experience' as a 'consulting specialist'
rather than a treating physician." Order, dated September 26, 2002, Findings of Fact, p. 2.
Dr. Bateman testified at the hearing:
[W]e do two types of visits: we do consultative visits and then I see patients
who come to me for management. And she came for a consultative visit. And
she had a number of doctors who were taking care of her, so there was no
point in me doing management of her care.
Tr.60: 11-16.
The Board finds that Dr. Bateman testified "that Petitioner's worst and most difficult
problems were pain and fatigue resulting from fibromyalgia," and that "there was no
objective way in which to measure Petitioner's pain and fatigue, but that she relied solely on
petitioner's self-reported symptoms." Order, dated September 26, 2002, p. 2.
Dr. Bateman was asked at the hearing:
[I]f you could go through her problems and her physical impairments in order
of severity . . . As close as you can, in order of their severity . .. what are her
most severe symptoms in 2000.
Tr. 64: 21-23, 65: 13-15. Dr. Bateman responded:
I can tell you that the content of our visit is, we don't list it in order of severity . . . We talk
about fatigue, and pain, and sleep, and we do it in that order
And I can tell you based on
what I know of her and what I . . . would think that her two most, and this is true with
fibromyalgia in general, that fatigue and pain are interconnected symptoms. And that - that
fatigue and pain are usually the most limiting.... So I would say that pain and fatigue are
right up there as number one and two.
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Tr. 66: 2-13, 68: 2-3. Dr. Bateman was asked:
And when you diagnose pain or fatigue, are those objective observations or
are they subjective, as to what the patient describes?
Dr. Bateman responded:
By definition they're subjective. I believe that indirectly you can get objective
data, but it has to do with looking at performance, looking at what they've
been able to do, and see if their symptoms are consistent. But by very nature,
fibromyalgia, its complete diagnosis, its clinical diagnosis and everything
about it is subjective. With the exception of tender points, which are a feeble
attempt to rescue some kind of objective data for these patients. That's all we
have, except the things I quoted you. I talked to you about lots of objective
data used on a research basis, it just has not evolved to the point where it's
used clinically.
Tr. 81:18-25,82: 1-7.
The Board finds that Dr. Bateman testified she was not an employment specialist and
did not know the legal standards for disability in this case. Order, dated September 26,2002,
Findings of Fact, p. 2. At the hearing Dr. Bateman testified as follows:
Q. So have you provided impairment ratings for individuals, patients in the
past?
A. You know, I don't use the term impairment ratings. Maybe it would be a
better way to - you know, I assess level of function and make determinations
about how impaired people are, and I do that on many occasions.
Q. Are you aware how, say, the Utah Department of Lavor classifies
fibromyalgia for impairment ratings?
A. No.
Q. Okay. Would that be important in determining whether they're disabled,
to look at a standard to determine impairment?
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A. You know, Id like to say that I'm not the one determining if she's disabled.
I made a comment in my assessment about whether she was disabled. My
consultation is to - to (inaudible), to assess her illness and her combined
symptoms, and to make a statement about what I think her multiple problems
are. And then I made a one-sentence recommendation about whether I thought
she was disabled or not. But I'm not the one determining disability.
Tr. 79: 21-25, 80: 1-16.
The Board Did Not Support Its Decision With Substantial Evidence. Board correctly
pointed out in its findings that Dr. Bateman is not an employment specialist, and as Dr.
Bateman acknowledged, she is capable of determining the level of impairment, but not the
issue of "disability." Mr. Davis, however, is also not an employment specialist, and his
testimony and curriculum vita indicate he does not have the training or experience to opine
on the issue of "disability." No vocational experts testified at the hearing.
Mr. Davis testified he uses a "chart" for determining which category of "physical
demand level" individuals are capable of. Mr. Davis testified that he placed Ms. Murphy in
the "light" physical demand level in his evaluation. Tr. 90:13-25. He also testified that base
on her ability to lift thirty-five pounds twelve inches, and her ability to carry a twenty-five
pound box thirty feet, she demonstrated she "would actually be into the medium category."
Tr. 100: 8-17.

At the hearing Petitioner's attorney objected to Mr. Davis's "physical

demand characteristics work chart" in that this chart was not the "best evidence" of the
DOT's descriptions of its strength ratings of jobs, was an incomplete summary of the DOT,
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and did not contain important aspects of the original document.9 Tr. 90: 23-25, 91: -92.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-8(l)(b)(iii) provides that a presiding officer:
may receive documentary evidence in the form of a copy or excerpt if the copy
or excerpt contains all pertinent portions of the original document.
In this case, the "work chart" may have been admitted as evidence of what Mr. Davis based
the vocational aspects of his evaluation upon, but would have been inadmissible as a
representation of the DOT's "strength ratings" that Mr. Davis erroneously believed he was
applying. Mr. Davis testified he has never seen the actual DOT. Tr. 103: 5-6.
The DOT places the exertional requirements for work activities into categories of
"sedentary," "light," "medium," "heavy," and "very heavy." These levels of exertion
include, as an important element of categorization, durational requirements, i.e., the
exertional levels required for the job-related activities of sitting, standing, walking, lifting,
carrying, pushing/pulling are measured not only in terms of exerting "pounds of force," but
also in terms of sustaining that exertion of force over varying periods of time. According to

^ h e transcript does not record specific objections by Petitioner's attorney
concerning the "work chart." A discussion of the chart occurred "off the record," during a
recess ordered by the hearing officer. The transcript does record that the "work chart"
was believed to be based upon the Department of Labor's Dictionary of Occupational
Titles ("DOT") strength ratings. A true copy of the DOT's job category strength ratings
was offered by Petitioner's attorney-which the transcript indicates the hearing officer
accepted into evidence and marked as Exhibit "C." Respondent's attorney objected to
the true copy of the DOT coming into evidence as the Board's exhibit, however it is
unclear from the transcript whether the true copy of the DOT came in as Petitioner's or
Respondent's exhibit. It is also unclear from the transcript whether the "work chart,"
itself, was admitted into evidence. Tr. 90: 13-25; 91, 92.
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the DOT, "frequently" means from one-third to two-thirds of the time, and "occasionally"
means up to one-third of the time. These requirements for exerting pounds of force as a
sustained effort over time, is a concept that is central to the DOT's exertional levels or
"strength ratings" for job categories. Mr. Davis testified he was unaware of the element of
time required in the DOT's description of its "strength rating" categories.
According to the DOT, a "light" level of exertion requires an individual to walk or
stand "frequently"- up to six hours out of an eight-hour work day10-exert up to 20 pounds of
force "occasionally"-up to two and one half hours of an eight hour workday-or sit most of
the time but push and pull arm or leg controls. According to the DOT a "medium" level of
exertion requires that an individual be capable of exerting twenty to fifty pounds of force for
up to two and one half hours of an eight-hour workday ("occasionally") and/or from ten to
twenty five pounds of force for up to 6 hours of an eight-hour work day ("frequently"), and
be able to stand more than 6 hours per eight-hour workday.

Exhibit C, p. 2.

Because Mr. Davis was unaware of the durational requirements, he evaluated Ms.
Murphy as demonstrating performance at a "light" level of exertion, even though she tested
in the activity of standing for only fourteen minutes without a break, (and nineteen minutes
with three to four short breaks) and tested in the area of walking for only ten minutes, and
standing/walking combined for a total one hour over the two day evaluation, with sitting

10

"Light" level is defined as "in excess of those for Sedentary Work" and the
standing/walking requirement for "sedentary" is "occasional" or up to one-third of the
time- approximately two and one half hours of an eight hour work-day.
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breaks in between. Tr. 97: 10; 105: 18-25; 106; 107: 1-15.
Although Mr. Davis had never seen the DOT or its durational requirements for
sustained efforts, his routine for evaluating individuals does include a type of evaluation for
extrapolating sustained efforts from his testing data. Mr. Davis testified he used the "MET"
for estimating Ms. Murphy's ability for a sustained effort. This test consists of measuring
her "heart rate" during a "step test." Ms. Murphy stepped up and down to a one and a half
inch step for three minutes, took a short break, and stepped up and down to a six inch step
for three minutes. Mr. Davis estimated that Ms. Murphy's "physiological response" placed
her at a "light" work level. Tr. 98:2-8.

Mr. Davis's training and experience, according to

his curriculum vita and his testimony, is in the area of worker's compensation cases, and
involve the rehabilitation and evaluation of injured workers. His undergraduate work at the
WERK center at Brigham Young University as a physical therapy aid was where he "first got
exposure to working with and evaluating injured workers." He later worked for four years
in the Idaho Falls hospital where he "was in charge of and worked with exclusively workers'
compensation cases. Mr. Davis testified that he "attended several continuing education
courses related to evaluation and treatment of injured workers." Respondent's Exhibit A, Tr.
86-87. Mr. Davis's background and training are important consideration in assessing his
ability to evaluate Ms. Murphy's functional limitations-in that Ms. Murphy is not an injured
worker.
Dr. Bateman highlighted the problems with evaluating an individual with systemic
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illness or chronic problems who cannot sustain activities over longer periods of time, with
short term methods designed to test and evaluate a worker's acute injuries. Dr. Bateman
testified she had reviewed Mr. Davis' s functional capacity evaluation and offered an in depth
opinion about its shortcomings. Tr. 52-58, 80: 22-25, 81: 1-10.
Dr. Bateman testified that fibromyalgia patients "are able to perform short-term and
in a limited fashion with the consequence of escalation of their symptoms, either when they
do it for a prolonged period, or when they do it for sequential periods." Tr. 53: 5-8. She
opined that:
[t]his kind of an evaluation . . . does not take into account fatigueability over
time, in a day, with repetitive motion . . . by fatiguability I mean not only
causing more fatigue, but causing more pain, and the two interact. It doesn't
take into account developing overuse syndromes, which she has had well
documented in plantar fasciitis, which is an overuse syndrome in the feet, and
carpal tunnel which is an overuse syndrome in the hands. And is a known,
associated problem with fibromyalgia and with hepatitis C. It doesn't take into
account post-exertional delays in pain that occur the next day, or that
accumulate over a period of time, which symptoms are the homework of
fibromyalgia . . . So this kind of an assessment is not a good assessment for
determining anything about fibromyalgia, other than, acute strength, short-term
ability to sit. . . And I think the data in his report is fine, but extrapolating
beyond the data becomes risky in terms of estimating someone's ability to
work.
Tr. 57, 58: 1-2. Ms. Murphy testified to the post-exertional delays in pain she
experienced the days after her evaluation by Mr. Davis. Tr. 24, 25: 1-13.
Dr. Bateman opined upon Mr. Davis's description of Ms. Murphy's pain being "nonanatomic," stating:
I found her symptoms to be - her report of pain to be very consistent. .. her
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pain drawing to be consistent with her report, consistent with his report... the
findings are entirely consistent with her syndrome, the places that pain occurs
in fibromyalgia. And so in that way, they're entirely anatomic, and they relate
to her prior underlying injuries. Her carpal tunnel syndrome is significantly
anatomic; her myofascia pain from her prior head and neck injuries of her neck
and shouders is exactly anatomic; and her foot and ankle pain... I don't know
if it's just fibro or if it relates to, you can get a peripheral neuropathy from
hepatitis C.
Tr. 56: 6-25.
Dr. Bateman testified regarding Dr. Anderson's medical statement in a Residual
Functional Capacity Questionnaire, agreeing with Dr. Anderson that Ms. Murphy's
impairments would likely cause her to be absent from work more than four days per month:
Yes. In fact, I think given Joanna's combination of medical problems, that she
would have difficulty working sequential full-time days, even in a week.
Tr. 58:21-25,59:1-16; Petitioner's Exhibit 5. Dr. Bateman also gave her opinion regarding
Ms. Murphy's ability to work. Responding to the hearing officers question:
Now, based upon that diagnosis, you did not make any determination about
whether she was impaired for working?
Dr. Bateman testified:
I did make a statement about that on the recent visit saying I felt like she was
unable to work full-time due to her combined problems.
Tr. 85: 11-13.
Ms. Murphy and Dr. Bateman also testified to the issues delineated in pages
eleven through fourteen of this brief. Consistent with Dr. Bateman's testimony concerning
Ms. Murphy's loss of balance, Mr. Davis testified that the during the following stair climbing
test, Ms. Murphy used a handrail, "primarily for assistance in balance, not necessarily for
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assistance in strength." Tr. 98: 16-17. It is clear that Mr. Davis does not have the medical
training to properly assess how Ms. Murphy's medical problems would be expected to effect
her ability to perform work-related activities over a sustained period of time, such as that
required for regular full-time employment in a competitive work environment.
By failing to consider Ms. Murphy's medical records and other medical statements,
the Board ignored the bulk of Ms. Murphy's case. Dr. Sara Jane Anderson, Ms. Murphy's
regular treating physician since 1983, has the greatest familiarity with Ms. Murphy's medical
condition and has followed the progression of her disease over the years. Petitioner's Exhibit
4. Dr. Anderson indicated in her functional capacity evaluation that Ms. Murphy cannot
sustain the demands of full-time work, even at a "sedentary" level of physical exertion, that
her pain is often severe enough to interfere with her attention and concentration, and that her
pain medication makes her drowsy. Dr. Anderson reports Ms. Murphy needs to shift
positions at will from sitting, standing or walking, and that she can stand and walk less than
two hours total in an eight-hour day. Dr. Anderson reports that Ms. Murphy's carpel tunnel
leaves her with significant limitations in doing repetitive reaching, handling, and fingering,
that her fatigue and generalized pain, including frequent headaches, would result in frequent
absences from work, "more than four days per month." Petitioner's Exhibit 5. Ms. Murphy's
most recent physical therapist, Debra Stafshoolt, reports functional limitations consistent
with Dr. Anderson's. Petitioner's Exhibit 6.
The Board failed to consider medical reports documenting Ms. Murphy's diagnoses
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of fibromyalgia by Dr. Lee Smith, Petitioner's Exhibit 3, by Dr. Anderson, Petitioner's
Exhibit 4, and by Dr. Bateman, Petitioner's Exhibits 8-9. The Board failed to consider
medical reports of Dr. Stanchfield, Petitioner's Exhibit 15. The Board failed to consider
medical reports diagnosing carpel tunnel, diagnosed by nerve conduction study, Petitioner's
Exhibits 12 and 22, Hashimoto thyroiditis, Exhibit 15n, plantar fasciitis with edema of right
leg, Petitioner's Exhibit 11, abnormal MRI, Petitioner's Exhibit 12, sleep diagnostic report,
Exhibit 13, Celiac disease with pathology report, Petitioner's Exhibit 16-17, hypersensitivity
reactions, Petitioner's Exhibits 18-20, and problems with eye inflammation, Petitioner's
Exhibit 10.
Mr. Davis has no training or background as a vocational expert and could offer no
testimony concerning what exertional level of job category would be "reasonble" for Ms.
Murphy, considering relevant vocational experience or the level of any proven impairments
she has. "Total disability" requires vocational considerations be included in a determination
of "reasonable" employment. The issues of whether there are occupations or jobs available
for an individual with severe carpel tunnel, or an individual with an expected level of
absenteeism from work, were not addressed.
CONCLUSION
This Court should first find that the Board incorrectly interpreted the law when
refusing to consider the medical records and statements submitted into evidence. Second,
this Court should find that the Board bears a burden in providing the vocational expertise
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necessary to make its required findings on the "reasonableness" of any gainful occupation
under the definition of "total disability," and which it failed to provide in this case. Lastly,
this Court should find that the Board failed to base its determination upon substantial
evidence, for all of the reasons above delineated.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

ft

day of August, 2003.

UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
Attorneys for Appellants

BY: L. Kathleen Ferro
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63-46b-16. J u d i c i a l review — F o r m a l adjudicative pro
ceedings.
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative
proceedings.
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review_o?
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required by
the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court.
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court.
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial
review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, except that:
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten,
summarize, or organize the record;
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and
copies for the record:
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or
(ii) according to any other provision of law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action
is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any
statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decisionmaking process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure;
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency
justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-16, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 272; 1988, cb. 72, § 26.
Cross-References. — Review of proceed-

mgs before State Tax Commission, jurisdiction
and standard, §§ 59-1-601, 59-1-610,
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78-2a-3.

Court of Appeals j u r i s d i c t i o n .

(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and
to issue all writs and process necessary(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public
Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands
actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural
Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of
the state or other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court: of record in criminal cases,
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those
involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony;
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by
persons who are incarcerated or serving .any other criminal sentence,
except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence
for a first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases
involving a first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases,
including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court:; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has
original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63,
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 47, § 46; 1987, ch. 161, § 304; 1988,
ch. 73, § 1; 1988, ch. 210, § 141; 1988, ch.
248, § 8; 1990, ch. 80, § 5; 1990, ch. 224, § 3;
1991, ch. 268, § 22; 1992, ch. 127, § 12; 1994,
ch. 13, § 45; 1995, ch. 299, § 47; 1996, ch.
159, § 19; 1996, ch. 198, § 49.
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective April 27, 1992, added Subsection (2)(h) and redesignated former Subsections
(2)(h) through (j) as Subsections (2)(i) through
(k).
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994,
substituted "Board of Pardons and Parole" for
"Board of Pardons" in Subsection (2)(h) and
inserted "Administrative Procedures Act" in
Subsection (4).
The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995,
substituted "School and Institunonal Trust

Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Sovereign
Lands and Forestry actions reviewed by the
executive director of the Department of Natural
Resources" for "Board of State Lands" in Subsection (2)(a).
The 1996 amendment by ch. 159, effective
July 1, 1996, substituted "Division of Forestry,
Fire and State Lands7* for "Division of Sovereign Lands and Forestry" in Subsection (2)(a).
The 1996 amendment by ch. 198, effective
July 1, 1996, deleted former Subsection (2)(d),
listing appeals from circuit courts, and redesignated former Subsections (2)(e) to (2)(k) as
(2)(d) to (2Xj).
This section is 3et out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.
Cross-References. — Composition and jurisdiction of military court, §§ 39-6-15, 39-6-16.
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created by this title are not subject to alienation or assignment by the member,
retiree, participant, or their beneficiaries and are not subject to attachment,
execution, garnishment, or any other legal or equitable process.
(2) The office may, upon the request of the retiree, deduct from the retiree's
allowance insurance premiums or other dues payable on behalf of the retiree,
but only to those entities that have received the deductions prior to February
1, 2002
(3) (a) The office shall provide for the division of an allowance, defined
contribution account, continuing monthly death benefit, or refund of
member contributions upon termination to former spouses and family
members under an order of a court of competent jurisdiction with respect
to domestic relations matters on file with the office.
(b) The court order shall specify the manner in which the allowance,
defined contribution account, continuing monthly death benefit, or refund
of member contributions shall be partitioned, whether as a fixed amount
or as a percentage of the benefit.
(c) Allowances, continuing monthly death benefits, and refunds of
member contributions split under a domestic relations order are subject to
the following:
(i) the period for which payments shall be made under the original
domestic relations order may not be altered;
(ii) payments to an alternate payee shall begin at the time the
member or beneficiary begins receiving payments; and
(iii) the alternate payee shall receive payments in the same form as
payments received by the member or beneficiary.
(4) In accordance with federal law, the board may deduct the required
amount from any benefit, payment, or other right accrued or accruing to any
member of a system, plan, or program under this title to offset any amount that
member owes to a system, plan, or program administered by the board.
(5) The board shall make rules to implement this section.
History: C. 1953, 49-1-609, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 1, § 28; 1990, ch. 83, § 1; 1991, ch.
224, § 2; 1994, ch. 90, § 6; 1995, ch. 197, § 8;
2000, ch. 283, § 4; 2001, ch. 141, § 6; renumbered by L. 2002, ch. 250, § 35.
Amendment Notes. — The 2000 amendment, effective March 16, 2000, in Subsection
(3)(a) substituted "service retirement" for "retirement" and inserted "continuing monthly
death benefit."

The 2001 amendment, effective March 15,
2001, added Subsections (3)(d) through (f) and
redesignated former Subsection (3)(d) as (g)
The 2002 amendment, effective March 26,
2002, renumbered this section, which formerly
appeared as § 49-1-609, rewrote Subsections
( ^ (2) and (3), and redesignated former Subsection (3)(g) as (5)

49-11-613. Appeals procedure — Right of appeal to hearing officer — Board reconsideration — Judicial
review.
(1) (a) All members, retirees, participants, alternative payees, or covered
individuals of a system, plan, or program under this title shall acquaint
themselves with their rights and obligations under this title.
(b) A person who claims a benefit, legal right, or employment right
under this title shall request a ruling by the executive director.
(c) A person who is dissatisfied by a ruling of the executive director with
respect to any benefit claim or legal right under any system, plan, or
program under this title shall request a review of that claim by a hearing
officer.
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(2) The hearing officer shall
(a) be hired by the executive director after consultation with the board;
(b) follow the procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b,
Administrative Procedures Act, except as specifically modified under this
title;
(c) hear and determine all facts pertaining to applications for benefits
under any system, plan, or program under this title and all matters
pertaining to the administration of the office, and
(d) make conclusions of law m determining the person's rights under
any system, plan, or program under this title and matters pertaining to
the administration of the office
(3) The board shall review and approve or deny all decisions of the hearing
officer in accordance with rules adopted by the board.
(4) The moving party m any proceeding brought under this section shall
bear the burden of proof
(5) A party may file an application for reconsideration by the board upon any
of the following grounds
(a) that the board acted in excess of its powers;
(b) that the order or award was procured by fraud;
(c) that the evidence does not justify the determination of the hearing
officer; or
(d) that the party has discovered new material evidence that could not,
with reasonable diligence, have been discovered or procured prior to the
hearing.
(6) The board shall affirm, reverse, or modify the decision of the hearing
officer, or remand the application to the hearing officer for further consideration.
(7) A party aggrieved by the board's decision may obtain judicial review by
complying with the procedures and reqiurements of Title 63, Chapter 46b,
Administrative Procedures Act.
(8) The board may make rules to implement this section
History: C. 1953, 49-1-610, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 1, § 29; 1987, ch. 112, § 2; 1987, ch.
161, § 150; 1988, ch. 102, § 2; 1988, ch. 179,
§ 5; 1992, ch. 157, § 4; 1993, ch. 226, § 2;
2001, ch. 141, § 7; renumbered by L. 2002,
ch. 250, § 36.
Amendment Notes. — The 2001 amend-

ment, effective March 15, 2001, added Subsection (3) and redesignated the former Subsections (3) and (4) as (4) and (5)
The 2002 amendment, effective March 26,
2002, renumbered and rewrote this section,
which formerly appeared as § 49-1-610

49-11-614. Vesting on t e r m i n a t i o n of system or plan.
If any system or the Utah Governors' and Legislators' Retirement Plan is
terminated, the accrued benefits of each member in the terminated system or
plan shall immediately become vested and nonforfeitable.
History: C. 1953, 49-1-613, enacted by L.
1990, ch. 273, § 6; renumbered by L. 2002,
ch. 250, § 37.
Amendment Notes. — The 2002 amend
ment, effective March 26, 2002, renumbered
this section, which formerly appeared as § 49

1-613, substituted "system or the Utah Governors' and Legislators' Retirement Plan" for "retirement plan established under this title,"
substituted "terminated system or plan" for
"plan" and deleted "100%" before "vested "
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History: C. 1953, 49-20-406, e n a c t e d by L.
2002, ch. 220, * 2, r e n u m b e r e d by L. 2002,
ch. 220, § 4
C o o i d i n a t i o n clause — Thus section was
enacted as § 49 8 406 it was renumbeied bv
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the cooidination clause in L 2002 ch 220
$ 4(2)(b) foi consistency with the 1 ecodiiication
ot this title by L 2002 ch 250
Effective Dates — Laws 2002 ch 220 § 3
makes the act effective on July 1 2002
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PARTI
GENERAL PROVISIONS
49-21-101. Title.
This chapter is known as the "Public Employees' Long-Term Disability Act "
History: C. 1953, 49-9-101, e n a c t e d by L.
1987, ch. 1, § 165, r e n u m b e r e d by L. 2002,
ch. 250, § 195
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 2002 amend
ment, effective March 26, 2002 renumbered

49-21-102.

this section which formerly appeared as § 49
9 101, and substituted 'Public Employees
Long-Term Disability Act' for 'Utah Public Employees Disability Act '

Definitions.

As used m this chapter
(1) "Date of disability" means the date on which a period of continuous
disability commences, and may not commence on or before the last day of
actual work
(2) "Elimination period" means the three months at the beginning of
each continuous period of total disability for which no benefit will be paid
and commences with the date of disability
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(3) (a) "Eligible employee" means:
(i) any regular full-time employee as defined under Section
49-12-102 or 49-13-102, public safety service employee as defined
under Section 49-14-102 or 49-15-102, or judge as defined under
Section 49-17-102 or 49-18-102, whose employer provides coverage under this chapter, or the governor of the state; and
(ii) an employee who is covered by a retirement program
offered by the Teachers' Insurance and Annuity Association of
America, if the employee's employer provides coverage under this
chapter; and
(b) "Eligible employee" does not include any employee t h a t is
exempt from coverage under Section 49-21-201.
(4) "Maximum benefit period" means the maximum period of time the
monthly disability income benefit will be paid under Section 49-21-403 for
any continuous period of total disability.
(5) "Monthly disability benefit" means the monthly payments and
accrual of service credit under Sectioa 49-21-401 and health insurance
reimbursements paid under Section 49-21-408, or any combination of
them.
(6) "Objective medical impairment" means an impairment resulting
from an injury or illness which is diagnosed by a physician and which is
based on accepted objective medical tests or findings rather than subjective complaints.
(7) "Physician" means a licensed physician.
(8) "Regular monthly salary" means the amount certified by the participating employer as the monthly salary of the eligible employee, unless
there is a discrepancy between the certified amount and the amount
actually paid, in which case the office shall determine the regular monthly
salary.
(9) "Regular occupation" means either the primary duties performed by
the eligible employee for the twelve months preceding the date of disability, or a permanent assignment of duty to the eligible employee.
(10) "Rehabilitative employment" means any occupation or employment
for wage or profit, for which the eligible employee is reasonably qualified
to perform based on education, training, or experience while unable to
perform the employee's regular occupation.
(11) (a) "Total disability" or "totally disabled" means the complete
inability, due to objective medical impairment, whether physical or
mental, to engage in the eligible employee's regular occupation during
the elimination period and the first 24 months of disability benefits.
(b) "Total disability" means, after the elimination period and the
first 24 months of disability benefits, the complete inability, based
solely on physical objective medical impairment, to engage in any
gainful occupation which is reasonable, considering the eligible employee's education, training, and experience.
History: C. 1953, 49-9-103, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 1, § 167; 1987, ch. I l l , § 2; 1994,
ch. 270, § 1; 1995, ch. 197, § 22; 1996, ch. 79,
§ 63; 1999, ch. 292, § 19; 2000, ch. 283, § 8;
renumbered by L. 2002, ch. 250, § 196.
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amendment, effective March 19, 1999, added Subsection (6), making related designation changes,
and m Subsection (9) substituted the language
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beginning "medically determinable" and ending
"not less than 12 months" for "injury and lllness" in the first sentence and inserted "medically determinable" m the second sentence
The 2000 amendment, effective March 16,
2000, deleted "but is not hmited to" after "term
includes" m the second sentence of Subsection
(2) and "which can be expected to result in
death or which has lasted or can be expected to
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(5) Firefighter service employees, as defined under Section 49-16-102, are
not eligible for coverage under this chapter.
(6) Public safety service employees, as defined in Sections 49-14-102 and
49-15-102, who are covered under a long-term disability program offered by an
employer which is substantially similar to this program are not eligible for
coverage under this chapter.
(7) Legislators are not eligible for coverage under this chapter.
History: C. 1953, 49-9-203, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 1, § 170; 1987, ch. Ill, § 3; 1991,
ch. 282, § 1; 1992, ch. 157, § 27; renumbered by L. 2002, ch. 250, § 200.

Amendment Notes. — The 2002 amendment, effective March 26, 2002, renumbered
and rewrote this section, which formerly appeared as § 49-9-203

PART 3
CONTRIBUTIONS
49-21-301. Contributions to fund program —Adjustment
of premium rate.
(1) During each legislative session, the board shall certify to the Legislature
the employer paid premium rate expressed as a percentage of salary which is
required to fund the Public Employees' Long-Term Disability Trust Fund.
(2) Upon the board's recommendation, the Legislature shall adjust the
premium rate to maintain adequate funding for the Public Employees' LongTerm Disability Trust Fund.
History: C. 1953, 49-9-301, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 1, § 171; 1990, ch. 285, § 24; 1994,
ch. 90, § 23; renumbered by L. 2002, ch.
250, § 201.
Amendment Notes. — The 2002 amendment, effective March 26, 2002, renumbered

this section, which formerly appeared as § 499-301, inserted "Long-Term" in Subsection (1);
and substituted "Public Employees' Long-Term
Disability Trust Fund" for "disability trust
fund" m Subsection (2).

PART 4
DISABILITY BENEFITS
49-21-401. Disability benefits — Application — Eligibility.
(1) An eligible employee shall apply for long-term disability benefits under
this chapter by:
(a) completing an application form prepared by the office;
(b) signing a consent form allowing the office access to the eligible
employee's medical records; and
(c) providing any documentation or information reasonably requested
by the office.
(2) Upon request by the office, the participating employer of the eligible
employee shall provide to the office documentation and information concerning
the eligible employee.
(3) The office shall review all relevant information and determine whether
or not the eligible employee is totally disabled.
(4) If the office determines t h a t the eligible employee is totally disabled due
to accidental bodily injury or physical illness which is not the result of the
performance of an employment duty, the eligible employee shall receive a
monthly disability benefit equal to % of the eligible employee's regular
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monthly salary, for each month the total disability continues beyond the
elimination period, not to exceed the maximum benefit period
(5) If the office determines t h a t the eligible employee is totally disabled due
to psychiatric illness, the eligible employee shall receive
(a) a maximum of two years of monthly disability benefits equal to % of
the eligible employee's regular monthly salary for each month the total
disability continues beyond the elimination period,
(b) a maximum of $10,000 for psychiatric expenses, including rehabilitation expenses approved by the office's consultants, paid during the
period of monthly disability benefits, and
(c) payment of monthly disability benefits according to contractual
provisions for a period not to exceed five years if the eligible employee is
institutionalized due to psychiatric illness
(6) If the office determines t h a t the eligible employee is totally disabled due
to a physical injury resulting from external force or violence as a result of the
performance of an employment duty, the eligible employee shall receive a
monthly disability benefit equal to 100% of the eligible employee's regular
monthly salary, for each month t h e total disability continues beyond the
elimination period, not to exceed the maximum benefit period
(7) (a) Successive periods of disability are considered as a continuous period
of disability if the period of disability
(l) results from the same or related causes,
(n) is separated by less t h a n six months of continuous full-time
work at the individual's usual place of employment, and
(111) commences while t h e individual is an eligible employee covered by this chapter
(b) The inability to work for a period of less t h a n 15 consecutive days is
not considered as a period of disability
(c) If Subsection (7)(a) or (b) does not apply, successive periods of
disability are considered as separate periods of disability
(8) The office may, at any time, have any eligible employee claiming
disability examined by a physician chosen by the office to determine if the
eligible employee is totally disabled
(9) A claim brought by an eligible employee for long-term disability benefits
under the Public Employee's Long-Term Disability Program is barred if it is
not commenced within one year from the eligible employee's date of disability,
unless the office determines t h a t under the surrounding facts and circumstances, the eligible employee's failure to comply with the time limitations was
reasonable
(10) Medical or psychiatric conditions which existed prior to enrollment may
not be a basis for disability benefits until the eligible employee has had one
year of continuous enrollment in t h e Public Employees Long-Term Disability
Program
(11) If there is a valid benefit protection contract, service credit shall accrue
during the period of total disability, unless the disabled eligible employee is
exempted from a system, or is otherwise ineligible for service credit
History: C. 1953, 49-9-401, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 1, § 172; 1987, ch. I l l , § 4; 1995,
ch. 197, § 23; 1998, ch. 267, § 10; 1999, ch.
292, § 20; renumbered by L. 2002, ch. 250,
§ 202.
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amendment, effective May 4, 1998, added Subsection
(5)
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The 1999 amendment, effective March 19,
1999, made two minor stylistic changes in Subsection (4) and added Subsection (6)
The 2002 amendment, effective March 26,
2002, renumbered and rewrote this section,
w n i c h formerly appeared as § 49-9-401
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34A-2-413. Permanent total disability — Amount of payments — Rehabilitation.
(1) (a) In cases of permanent total disability resulting from an industrial
accident or occupational disease, the employee shall receive compensation
as outlined in this section.
lb) To establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensation, the employee has the burden of proof to show b} a preponderance of
evidence that:
(i) the employee sustained a significant impairment or combination
of impairments as a result of the industrial accident or occupational
disease that gives rise to the permanent total disability entitlement;
(ii) the employee is permanently totally disabled; and
liii) the industrial accident or occupational disease was the direct
cause of the employee's permanent total disability
(c) To find an employee permanently totally disabled, the commission
shall conclude that:
(i) the employee is not gainfully employed;
(ii) the employee has an impairment or combination of impairments that limit the employee s ability to do basic work activities;
(iii) the industrial or occupationally caused impairment or combination of impairments prevent the employee from performing the
essential functions of the work activities for which the employee has
been qualified until the time of the industrial accident or occupational
disease that is the basis for the employee's permanent total disability
claim; and
liv) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably available,
taking into consideration the employee's age, education, past work
experience, medical capacity, and residual functional capacity.
Id) Evidence of an employee's entitlement to disability benefits other
than those provided under this chapter and Chapter 3. Utah Occupational
236

SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME
(d) Each State agency will be responsible for comprehensive oversight management of its consultative
examination program, with special emphasis on key
providers.
(e) A key consultative examination provider is a
provider that meets at least one of the following
conditions:
(1) Any consultative examination provider with an
estimated annual billing to the Social Security and
Supplemental Security Income programs of at least
$100,000; or
(2) Any consultative examination provider with a
practice directed primarily towards evaluation examinations rather than the treatment of patients; or
(3) Any consultative examination provider that does
not meet the above criteria, but is one of the top five
consultative examination providers in the State by
dollar volume, as evidenced by prior year data.
(f) State agencies have flexibility in managing their
consultative examination programs, but at a minimum
will provide:
(1) An ongoing active recruitment program for consultative examination providers;
(2) A process for orientation, training, and review of
new consultative examination providers, with respect
to SSA's program requirements involving consultative
examination report content and not with respect to
medical techniques;
(3) Procedures for control of scheduling consultative examinations;
(4) Procedures to ensure that close attention is
given to specific evaluation issues involved in each
case;
(5) Procedures to ensure that only required examinations and tests are authorized in accordance with
the standards set forth in this subpart;
(6) Procedures for providing medical or supervisory
approval for the authorization or purchase of consultative examinations and for additional tests or studies
requested by consulting medical sources. This includes physician approval for the ordering of any
diagnostic test or procedure where the question of
significant risk to the claimant/beneficiary might be
raised. See § 416.919m.
(7) Procedures for the ongoing review of consultative examination results to ensure compliance with
written guidelines;
(8) Procedures to encourage active participation by
physicians and psychologists in the consultative examination oversight program;
(9) Procedures for handling complaints;
(10) Procedures for evaluating claimant reactions to
key providers; and

§ 416.920

(11) A program of systematic, onsite reviews of key
providers that will include annual onsite reviews of
such providers when claimants are present for examinations. This provision does not contemplate that
such reviews will involve participation m the actual
examinations but, rather, offer an opportunity to talk
with claimants at the provider's site before and after
the examination and to review the provider's overall
operation.
(g) The State agencies will cooperate with us when
we conduct monitoring activities in connection with
their oversight management of their consultative examination programs.
[56 FR 36967, Aug 1, 1991, 65 FR 11880, March 7, 2000]
PROCEDURES TO MONITOR THE
CONSULTATIVE EXAMINATION
§ 416.919t

Consultative examination oversight.
(a) We will ensure that referrals for consultative
examinations and purchases of consultative examinations are made in accordance with our policies. We
will also monitor both the referral processes and the
product of the consultative examinations obtained.
This monitoring may include reviews by independent
medical specialists under direct contract with SSA.
(b) Through our regional offices, we will undertake
periodic comprehensive reviews of each State agency
to evaluate each State's management of the consultative examination process. The review will involve
visits to key providers, with State staff participating,
including a program physician when the visit will deal
with medical techniques or judgment, or factors that
go to the core of medical professionalism.
(c) We will also perform ongoing special management studies of the quality of consultative examinations purchased from key providers and other sources
and the appropriateness of the examinations authorized.
[56 FR 36968, Aug 1, 1991]
EVALUATION OF DISABILITY
§ 416.920

Evaluation of disability of adults, in
general.
(a) Steps in evaluating disability. We consider all
evidence in your case record when we make a determination or decision whether you are disabled. When
you file a claim for Supplemental Security Income
disability benefits and are age 18 or older, we use the
following evaluation process. If you are doing sufcr
stantial gainful activity, we will determine that you are
not disabled. If you are not doing substantial gainful
activity, we will first consider the effect of your physical or mental impairment; if you have more than one
impairment, we will also consider the combined effect
of your impairments. Your impairment(s) must be

Addendum 7 - 1

§ 416.920
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severe and meet the duration requirement before we
can find you to be disabled. We follow a set order to
determine whether you are disabled. We review any
current work activity, the seventy of your impairment(s), your residual functional capacity, your past
work, and your age, education, and work experience.
If we can find that you are disabled or not disabled at
any point in the review, we do not review your claim
further. Once you have been found eligible for Supplemental Security Income benefits based on disability, we follow a somewhat different order of evaluation
to determine whether your- eligibility continues, as
explained in § 416.994(b)(5).

§ 416.920a

Evaluation of mental impairments.
(a) General. The steps outlined m ^ 416.920 and
416.^24 apply to the evaiuation of physical and mental
impairments. In addition, when we evaluate the seventy of mental impairments for adults (persons a?e
18 and over) and in persons under age 18 when Part A
of the Listing of Impairments is used, we must follow
a special technique at each level in the administrative
review process. We describe this special technique in
paragraphs (b) through (e) of this section. Using this
technique helps us:
(1) Identify the need for additional evidence to determine impairment severity;

(b) If you are working. If you are working and the
work you are doing is substantial gainful activity, we
will find that you are not disabled regardless of your
medical condition or your age, education, and work
experience.
(c) You must have a severe impairment. If you do
not have any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits your physical or mental ability to do basic work activities, we will find that
you do not have a severe impairment and are, therefore, not disabled. WTe will not consider your* age,
education, and work experience.
(d) When your impairment(s) meets or equals a
listed impairment in Appendix 1. If you have an
impairment(s) which meets the duration requirement
and is listed in Appendix 1 or is equal to a listed
impairment(s), we will find you disabled without considering your age, education, and work experience.
(e) Your impairment(s) must prevent you from doing past relevant work. If we cannot make a decision
based on your current work activity or on medical
facts alone, and you have a severe impairment(s), we
then review your residual functional capacity and the
physical and mental demands of the work you have
done in the past. If you can still do this kind of work,
we will find that you are not disabled.
(f) Your impairment(s) must prevent you from doing other work.
(1) If you cannot do any work you have done in the
past because you have a severe lmpairment(s), we will
consider your residual functional capacity and your
age, education, and past work experience to see if you
can do other work. If you cannot, we will find you
disabled.
(2) If you have only a marginal education, and long
work experience (i.e., 35 years or more) where you
only did arduous unskilled physical labor, and you can
no longer do this kind of work, we use a different rule
(see § 416.962).
[50 FR 8728, March 5, 1985; 50 FR 19164, May 7, 1985; 56
FR 5554, Feb. 11, 1991; 56 FR 36968, Aug. I,"l991; 65 FR
80308, Dec. 21, 2000]

(2) Consider and evaluate functional consequences
of the mental disorder(s) relevant to your ability to
work; and
(3) Organize and present our findings in a clear
concise, and consistent manner.
(b) Use of the technique.
(1) Under the special technique, we must first evaluate your pertinent symptoms, signs, and laboratory
findings to determine whether you have a medically
determinable mental impairment(s). See § 416.908
for more information about what is needed to show a
medically determinable impairment. If we determine
that you have a medically determinable mental impairments), we must specify the symptoms, signs, and
laboratory findings that substantiate the presence of
the lmpairment(s) and document our findings in accordance with paragraph (e) of this section.
(2) We must then rate the degree of functional
limitation resulting from the impairment(s) in accordance with paragraph (c) of this section and record
our findings as set out in paragraph (e) of this sectiolT
(c) Rating the degree of functional limitation.
(1) Assessment of functional limitations is a complex and highly individualized process that requires us
to consider multiple issues and all relevant evidence to
obtain a longitudinal picture of your overall degree^ of
functional limitation. We will consider all relevant
and available clinical signs and laboratory findings,
the effects of your symptoms, and how your functioning may be affected by factors including, but not
limited to, chronic mental disorders, structured settings, medication, and other treatment.
(2) We will rate the degree of your afunctional
limitation based on the extent to which 'your impair;
ment(s) interferes with your ability to1 function independently, appropriately, effectively, and -on-a sustained basis. Thus, we will consider -such factors as
the quality and level of your overall Junctional performance, any episodic limitations, the^anjount q f ^
pervision or assistance you require, a n d ^ ^ j j S K
in which you are able to f u n c t i o n . ^ S e e \ I ^ j ^
through 12.00H of the Listing of Jmpairmenisc-w
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on the number of sedentary, unskilled occupations or
(i) While illiteracy or the inability to commumcat
the total number of jobs to which the individual may m English may significantly limit an individual's ^oc;
be able to adjust, considering his or her age, education tional scope, the primary work functions m the bulk i
and work experience, including any transferable skills unskilled work relate to working with things (rathe
or education providing for direct entry into skilled than with data or people) and m these work functior
at the unskilled level, literacy or ability to comrnun
work.
cate in English has the least significance. Similar]
(4) "Sedentary work" represents a significantly re- the lack of relevant work experience would have litt]
stricted range of work, and individuals with a maxi- significance since the bulk oi unskilled jobs require r
mum sustained work capability limited to sedentary qualifying work experience. Thus, the functional CJ
work have very serious functional limitations. There- pability for a full range of sedentary work represenl
fore, as with any case, a finding that an individual is sufficient numbers of jobs to indicate substantial voe;
limited to less than the full range of sedentary work tional scope for those individuals age 18-44 even
will be based on careful consideration of the evidence they are illiterate or unable to communicate in Ei
of the individual's medical lmpairment(s) and the limi- glish.
tations and restrictions attributable to it. Such evi- Table No. 1—Residual Functional Capacity: Max
dence must support the finding that the individual's
mum Sustained Work Capability Limited to Sec
residual functional capacity is limited to less than the
entary Work as a Result of Severe Medicall
full range of sedentary work.
Determinable Impairment(s)
Rule
20101
20102

Age
Advanced age
do

20103

da

20104

do

20105

do

20106

do

20107

do

20108

do

20109
201.10

Closely approaching
advanced age
do

20111

do

20112

do

20113

do

20114

do

20115

do

20116

do

20117
20118

Younger individual
age 45-49
do

20119

do

20120

do

20121

do

Education
Limited or less
do
do
High school graduate or
more-does not provide for
direct entry into skilled
work 2
High school graduate or
more-provides for direct
entry into skilled work 2
High school graduate or
more-does not provide for
direct entry into skilled
work2
do
High school graduate or
more-provides for direct
entry into skilled work 2
Limited or less
do
do
High school graduate or
more-does not provide for
direct entry into skilled
work 3
High school graduate or
more-pi ovides for direct
entry into skilled work 3
High school graduate oi
more-does not provide for
direct entry into skilled
work 3
do
High school graduate or
more-provides tor du ect
entry into skilled work 3
Illiterate or unable to communicate in English
Limited or less-at least liter
ate and able to communicate in English
Limited or less
do
High school graduate or more
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Previous work experience
Unskilled or none
Skilled or semiskdled-skills
not transferable l
Skilled or semiskdled-skills
transferable l
Unskilled or none

do

Decision
Disabled
Do
Not disabled
Disabled

Not disabled.

Skilled or semiskilled-slalls
not transferable l

Disabled

Skilled or semiskilled-skills
transferable *
Skilled or semiskilled-skills
not transferable l

Not disabled

Unskilled oi none

Disabled

Skilled or semiskilled-skills
not transferable
Skilled or semiskilled-skills
transferable
Unskilled or none

do

Do

Do
Not dis
abled
Disabled

Not disabled

Skilled or semiskilled-skills
not transferable

Disabled

Skilled or semiskilled-skills
transferable
Skilled or semiskilled-skills
not transferable

Not disabled
Do

Unskilled or none

Disabled

do

Skilled or semiskilled-skills
not transferable
Skilled or semiskilled-skills
transferable
Skilled or semiskilled-skills
not transferable

Not disabled
Do
Do
Do
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Subpt. P, App. 2
Rule
20122
20123
20124

Age
do
Younger individual
age 18-44
do

20125

do

20126

do

20127
20128

do
do

20129

do

Education
do
Illiterate or unable to communicate in English
Limited or less-at least literate and able to communicate ui English
Limited or less
do
High school graduate or more
do
do

Previous worK experience
Skilled or semiskilled-skills
transferable
Unskilled oi none
do
Skilled or semiskilled-skills
not transferable
Skilled or semiskilled-skills
transferable
Unskilled or none
Skilled or semiskilled-skills
not transferable
Skilled or semiskilled-skills
transferable

Decision
Do
Do 4
Do 4
Do 4
Do 4
Do 4
Do 4
Do 4

i See 201 00(f)
2 See 201 00(d)
3 See 201.00(g)
4 See 201 00(h)

202.00 Maximum sustained work capability limited
to light work as a result of severe medically determinable impairment(s). (a) The functional capacity to perform a full range of light work includes the functional
capacity to perform sedentary as well as light work.
Approximately 1,600 separate sedentary and light unskilled occupations can be identified in eight broad
occupational categories, each occupation representing
numerous jobs in the national economy. These jobs
can be performed after a short demonstration or
within 30 days, and do not require special skills or
experience.
(b) The functional capacity to perform a wide or full
range of light work represents substantial work capability compatible with making a work adjustment to
substantial numbers of unskilled jobs and, thus, generally provides sufficient occupational mobility even
for severely impaired individuals who are not of advanced age and have sufficient educational competencies for unskilled work.
(c) However, for individuals of advanced age who
can no longer perform vocationally relevant past work
and who have a history of unskilled work experience,
or who have only skills that are not readily transferable to a significant range of semi-skilled or skilled
work that is within the individual's functional capacity,
or who have no work experience, the limitations in
vocational adaptability represented by functional restriction to light work warrant a finding of disabled.
Ordinarily, even a high school education or more
which was completed in the remote past will have little
positive impact on effecting a vocational adjustment
unless relevant work experience reflects use of such
education.
(d) Where the same factors in paragraph (c) of this
section regarding education and work experience are
present, but where age, though not advanced, is a
factor which significantly limits vocational adaptability
(i.e., closely approaching advanced age, 50-54) and an
individual's vocational scope is further significantly
Rule

Age
Advanced age

limited by illiteracy or inability to communicate in
English, a finding of disabled is warranted.
(e) The presence of acquired skills that are readily
transferable to a significant range of semi-skilled or
skilled work within an individual's residual functional
capacity would ordinarily warrant a finding of not
disabled regardless of the adversity of age, or whether
the individual's formal education is commensurate
with his or her demonstrated skill level. The acquisition of work skills demonstrates the ability to perform
work at the level of complexity demonstrated by the
skill level attained regardless of the individual's formal
educational attainments.
(f) For a finding of transferability of skills to light
work for individuals of advanced age who are closely
approaching retirement age (age 60-64), there must
be very little, if any, vocational adjustment required in
terms of tools, work processes, work settings, or the
industry.
(g) While illiteracy or the inability to communicate
in English may significantly limit an individual's vocational scope, the primary work functions in the bulk of
unskilled work relate to working with things (rather
than with data or people) and in these work functions
at the unskilled level, literacy or ability to communicate in English has the least significance. Similarly,
the lack of relevant work experience would have little
significance since the bulk of unskilled jobs require no
qualifying work experience. The capability for light
work, which includes the ability to1 do sedentary work,
represents the capability for substantial numbers of
such jobs. This, in turn, represents substantial vocational scope for younger individuals (age 18-49) even if
illiterate or unable to communicate in English.
Table No. 2—Eesidual Functional Capacity: Maximum Sustained Work Capability Limited to Light
Work as a Result of Severe Medically Determinable Impairment(s)

Education
Limited or less
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Previous work experience
Unskilled or none

Decision
Disabled

BEFORE THE UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD

JOANNA MURPHY,
Petitioner,
;

ORDER

:
:

File #: 01-30D

v.
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD,
LONG TERM DISABILITY PROGRAM,

Respondent.

:

A hearing was held on April 29, 2002, before the Adjudicative Hearing Officer on
Petitioner's Request for Board Action. The Petitioner appeared with Counsel Kathleen Ferro. The
Board was represented by David B. Hansen. Based upon the evidence in this matter and the legal
memoranda submitted, the Adjudicative Hearing Officer makes the following Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

JoAnna Murphy ("Petitioner") was an employee of the State Health Department

from August 23, 1986, through July 10, 1998 as a Family/Child Care Specialist.
2.

The Utah State Retirement Board, Long-Term Disability Program ("LTD

Program") granted Petitioner a two year disability benefit from October 1998 through September

2000.
3.

On July 6, 2001, Petitioner was formally denied permanent and total disability

benefits due to a lack of objective medical documentation showing that Petitioner was totally and
permanently disabled from all employment based solely on physical impairment.
4.

A hearing was held on April 29,2002, in which the Petitioner and Dr. Lucinda

Bateman testified that the Petitioner's worst and most difficult problems were pain and fatigue
resulting from fibromyalgia. Dr. Bateman testified that there was no objective way in which to
measure Petitioner's pain and fatigue, but that she relied solely on petitioner's self-reported
symptoms. She also testified that she was not an employment specialist and did not know the
legal standards for disability in this case. Dr. Bateman testified she could not provide an opinion
about Petitioner's specific physical abilities, but could only provide a general opinion about
individuals who sufferfromfibromyalgiafromher "experience" as a "consulting specialist"
rather than a treating physician. Dr. Bateman was unable to conclusively determine whether
Petitioner suffered from any medically determinable physical impairment as a result of medically
acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. It should be noted that Dr. Bateman, in
her entire time as a "consulting specialist," spent less time with the Petitioner than Mr. Davis in
performing his functional capacity evaluation. No physician other than Dr. Bateman testified at
the hearing.
5.

Mr. Cory Davis, a physical therapist that performed a Physical Functional Capacity

Evaluation on Petitioner on November 17, 2000, and testified at the hearing on April 29, 2002,
that according to the Petitioner's objective abilities Petitioner could physically perform "light
duty" work. He also testified that the Petitioner, while not a malingerer, could perform more

physical activities than she perceived of her abilities. He concluded the following in his
testimony and in his report:
This general attitude, combined with other observations such as
excessive and non-anatomical pain drawing, excessively low
functional status reporting, self limitation without observed
secondary muscle recruitment, etc. are considered to be signs of
symptom magnification. In describing symptom magnification, I
am by no means implying intent. Rather, I am simply stating that
Ms. Murphy can do more, at times, than she currently
demonstrates, states or perceives. While her subjective reports
should not be disregarded, they should be considered within the
context of symptom magnification findings.
By performing lifting and carrying activities as outlined in the chart
above, Ms. Murphy demonstrated average functional abilities in
LIGHT Physical Demand Characteristic of Work Level according
to the U.S. Depart, of Labor. She demonstrated good overall body
mechanics, utilizing functional lower extremity strength well.
(Emphasis added.)
6.

Petitioner failed to provide any non-hearsay evidence showing she maintained any

medically determinable physical impairment from accepted clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-610 and § 49-9-401, Petitioner bears the

burden of proof in this matter. The Utah State Retirement Board is not subject to any state or
federal statute, rule, or common law, such as any shifting burden standard, in determining
whether a Petitioner qualifies for long-term disability benefits under Utah Code Annotated, Title
49.
2.

In order to qualify to receive permanent and total long-term disability benefits,
3

Petitioner must prove that she meets the definition of "totally disabled" found in Utah Code Ann.
§ 49-9-103(9), which reads in applicable part:
Total disability means . . . the complete inability, based solely on
medically determinable physical impairment, to engage in any gainful
occupation which is reasonable, considering the employee's education,
training, and experience.
Section 49-9-101(6) defines "medically determinable impaiiment:"
Medically determinable impairment" means an impairment that
results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological
abnormalities which can be shown by medically acceptable clinical
and laboratory diagnostic techniques. A physical or mental
impairment must be established by medical evidence consisting
of signs, symptoms, and laboratory findings, not only by the
individual^ statement or symptoms.
(Emphasis added.)
3.

In formal administrative adjudicative proceedings, "A finding of fact that was

contested may not be based solely on hearsay evidence unless that evidence is admissible under
the Utah Rules of Evidence." U.C.A. § 63-46b-10(3).
4.

Petitioner failed to meet the statutory standard of "total disability" found in Utah

Code Ann. § 49-9-103(9), because she did not show any medically determinable physical
impairment which prevented her from engaging in reasonable employment.

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner's appeal for permanent and total long-term
disability benefits is denied.

BOARD RECONSIDERATION
Within ten (10) days of a Board order, any party may file a written request for
reconsideration stating the specific grounds upon which relief is requested as set forth in Utah
Code Ann. §49-11-613. This filing for reconsideration is not a prerequisite for seeking judicial
review of the order on review. The request for reconsideration shall be filed with the Board and
one copy sent by mail to each person making the request. The Board chairman or executive
director shall issue a written order granting or denying the request within twenty (20) days of
receipt. If no order is issued within twenty (20) days, the request is denied.

JUDICIAL REVIEW
If Petitioner is aggrieved with the final Board order, she may seek a judicial review within
thirty (30) days after the date that the order constituting final Board action is issued. Petitioner
shall name the Board and all other appropriate parties as respondents. The Utah Court of
Appeals has jurisdiction to review all final Board actions resulting from formal proceedings. All
petitioners shall follow the procedures established in Utah Code Ann.§ 63-46b-17.
DATED this %(? day of September, 2002.

<r x

^"Ujy &t

^KM/l/^t ,\~^

~ James L. Barker, Jr.
Adjudicative Hearing Officer

/

The foregoing Findings ofFact, Conclusions ofLaw, and Order ofDenial of the Adjudicative
Hearing Officer is hereby adopted as the order of the Utah State Retirement Board.
Dated this l£> day ofgeptombor, 2002.

APPROVED AS TO FORM

UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD
BY
Duane C. Frisby

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this the / 1 day of-SepieHibcr, 2002,1 mailed a true and correct
copy of the above Order, postage pre-paid, to the following:

L. Kathleen Ferro
254 West 400 South, 2nd Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
David B. Hansen
Howard, Phillips & Andersen
560 East 200 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

l>tfbu fei*c^<—
Renee-Ienssn

PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' HEALTH PROGRAM
LONG-TERM DISABILITY PROGRAM
2002-2003
MASTER POLICY
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3

discontinuance of premium payments on behalf of the Eligible Employee for any
purpose, including leave without pay and similar circumstances

D.

Pre-Existing Conditions
Medical or psychological conditions which existed pnor to enrollment shall not be considered a
basis for disability benefits until the Eligible Employee has had one year of continuous
enrollment in the Program

E.

Overpayment and Recovery
If at any time the Program has made an overpayment to the Eligible Employee, the Eligible
Employee will have 30 days upon the receipt of written notification from the Program to make
arrangements for repayment If arrangements are not made by the Eligible Employee to rectify
any overpayments, the Program has the following rights
1
cancel coverage and make a request for repayment together with all attorney fees and
court costs, and/or
2.
offset any monies payable from the Program.

F.

Filing a Claim
1.
When an Eligible Employee is absent from employment as a result of a condition that
may result in a Total Disability, Eligible Employee shall contact Program.
2.

G.

Any claim brought by an Eligible Employee for long-term disability benefits is barred if
not commenced within one year from the date of that disability, unless Eligible Employee
can demonstrate to the Office's satisfaction, that due to extenuating circumstances the
Eligible Employee was prevented from filing a claim within one year of the disability

How to file a Claim.
1
The following information must be submitted to and received by the Program within 90
days of initial application
a.
Completed LTD application claim form, including a signed consent form
allowing the office access to the Eligible Employee's medical records and
employment records,
b
A detailed statement from Physician(s) describing the objective basis for the
diagnosis (including x-ray reports, and any other evaluative procedures),
2.

The Program may require that the Eligible Employee be examined by a health care
provider of the Program's choice

3.

Proof of Total Disability will be submitted at the Eligible Employee's own expense

4.

Eligible Employer must provide relevant information concerning the Eligible Employee's
status, including; payroll information, job description, inability to perform services, job
accommodations, etc

5.

An Eligible Employee must apply for all government disability benefits immediately
upon application to the Program and provide proof of such filing to the Program The
Eligible Employee must provide the Program with a copy of government's disability
award and/or denial letters If these benefits are denied, an Eligible Employee is
required to appeal the decision
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6.

All information requested above shall be sent to
Public Employees Long-Term Disability Program
560 East 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102-2004

Claims Appeal Process
1
If an Eligible Employee feels a disability claim has been denied inappropriately, a full
review of the claim may be requested by wntmg to the LTD Claims Review Committee
within 60 days of the date of the denial letter Requests should be mailed to
LTD Claims Review Committee
Long-Term Disability Program
560 East 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
2.

If an Eligible Employee disagrees with the decision or action taken by the LTD Claims
Review Committee, the Eligible Employee has withm 60 days the right to request an
Administrative Review from the Executive Director. Requests should be mailed to*
Utah Retirement Systems
Executive Director
540 East 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

3.

Upon receipt of written request, including any pertinent additional information or
comments, the Executive Director will review the case and either grant or deny the
request. The Eligible Employee will receive written notification withm 30 days of the
outcome Charges for medical records necessary for claims review are the Eligible
Employee's responsibility

4.

If the Eligible Employee is dissatisfied with the decision of the Executive Director,
Eligible Employee may, withm 30 days of the denial, request a review of that claim by a
hearing officer by filing a Request for Board Action. The Reguest for Board Action
should be on a standard form provided by and returned to the Retirement office

5.

The hearing officer will provide a written decision to be reviewed by the Board If the
Board finds against the Eligible Employee, the Eligible Employee may either petition the
Board for reconsideration or, withm 30 days appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals

BENEFITS
A.

Eligibility for Benefits
1
An Eligible Employee is qualified for a Monthly Disability Benefit if the Eligible
Employee has become Totally Disabled as a result of:
a.
an Accidental Bodily Injury;
b.
disease or illness causing Total Disability; or
c.
a physical injury resulting from external force or violence as a result of
the performance of duty

2

B.

To be eligible for a monthly Total Disability benefit, a disabled Eligible
Employee must be under the regular constant care of a Physician

Calculation of Monthly Disability Benefits
1
The Monthly Disability Benefit for a Totally Disabled Eligible Employee who
has become Totally Disabled due to Accidental Bodily Injury, disease or illness
is equal to two-thirds of the Eligible Employee's Regular Monthly Salary
2

The Monthly Disability Benefit for a Totally Disabled Eligible Employee who
has become Totally Disabled due to a physical injury which is the result of
external force or violence as a result of the performance of duty for an Employer,
the Monthly Disability Benefit will be equal to 100% of the Eligible Employees'
Regular Monthly Salary.

3.

The Monthly Disability Benefit for a Totally Disabled Eligible Employee who
has become Totally Disabled due to psychiatric illness, is equal to two-thirds of
the Eligible Employee's Regular Monthly Salary.
a.

b

C.

and if the Eligible Employee is institutionalized in an accredited mental
health institution, there is a 5 year Maximum Benefit Period benefit.

Duration of Benefits
1.
Monthly Disability Benefits will be paid during a period of Total Disability or
Total and Permanent Disability m accordance with Section I (I), and shall
terminate m accordance with Section IH (G), or when the Eligible Employee is
no longer disabled, whichever comes first.
2.

D.

An Eligible Employee who becomes Totally Disabled primarily
as a result of psychiatric illness may also be eligible for a
maximum benefit of $10,000 to be paid during the disability
period for psychiatric expenses, including rehabilitation
expenses approved by the Program's specialist,

If a Totally Disabled Eligible Employee has exhausted Eligible Employee's twoyear own occupation benefit based on a physical impairment, the Eligible
Employee may be eligible for a psychopathy disability benefit.

Rehabilitation
1.
All Eligible Employees receiving a Monthly Disability Benefit under the
Program shall be evaluated and when appropnate and may be required to engage
m a rehabilitation program. Benefits will be affected as follows:
a.
The Monthly Disability Benefit will be offset by 50% of the amount
earned in approved Rehabilitative Employment; and
b.
The rehabilitation benefitwill be payable for up to 24 months or to the
end of the Maximum Benefit Period, whichever occurs first.
2.

Each Eligible Employee receiving a Monthly Disability Benefit shall be
interviewed by the Program
The Program may refer the Eligible Employee to a disability specialist for a
review of the Eligible Employee's condition and a written rehabilitation plan
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E.

3

If an Eligible Employee receiving a Monthly Disability Benefit fails to
participate m an office-approved rehabilitation program withm the limitations set
forth by a Physician or rehabilitation specialist, the Monthly Disability Benefit
will be suspended or terminated.

4.

The Program may, as a condition of paying a Monthly Disability Benefit, require
that the Eligible Employee receive medical care and treatment if that treatment is
reasonable or usual according to current medical practices

Adjustments and Offsets
1.
In order to be eligible for a Monthly Disability Benefit the Eligible Employee
must apply for all Social Security, retirement, disability, workers compensation,
or any other insurance benefits to which the Eligible Employee may be entitled.
2.

The Monthly Disability Benefit shall be reduced by any amounts received by, or
payable to, the Eligible Employee from the following sources for the same penod
of time during which the Eligible Employee is entitled to receive a Monthly
Disability Benefit. Benefits under section (2) which are mcreased to reflect a
change m Consumer Price Index, the Monthly Disability Benefit shall not be
further reduced but shall only be offset by benefits determined at the level in
effect at the time of Total Disability:
a.
Social Security disability benefits, including all benefits received
by the Eligible Employee, the Eligible Employee's spouse, and
the Eligible Employee's dependent children;
b.
workers' compensation indemnity benefits;
c.
any monies received by judgment, legal action, or settlement
from a third party liable to the Eligible Employee for the
disability,
d.
unemployment compensation benefits;
e.
automobile no-fault, medical payments, or similar insurance
payments, and

3.

The Monthly Disability Benefit shall be reduced by any amount m excess of onethird of the Eligible Employee's Regular Monthly Salary received by, or payable
to, the Eligible Employee from the following sources for the same penod of time
dunng which the Eligible Employee is entitled to receive a Monthly Disability
Benefit
a.
any employer-sponsored retirement programs; and
b.
any disability benefit resulting from the disability for which
benefits are being received from the Program.

4.

Any amounts received by or payable to the Eligible Employee under the above
stated sources shall be considered as amounts received, whether or not they were
actually received.

5.

The Program may treat as a benefit any amount the Eligible Employee is entitled
to receive, but does not receive because application is not made, and reduce the
monthly benefit accordingly

